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I.  INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2001, the United States Supreme Court in J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (hereinafter “J.E.M.”),1
held that utility patents may be issued for plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101
(hereinafter "Utility Patent Act")2 despite distinct protections available under
the Plant Variety Protection Act (hereinafter “PVPA”)3 and the Plant Patent
Act (hereinafter “PPA”).4  J.E.M. was the first United States Supreme Court
decision in two decades to rule on the eligibility for patenting under the Utility
Patent Act.5  The Supreme Court’s decision has important implications for the
agricultural community.6  
This article addresses the meaning and significance of J.E.M. to the
agricultural sector.  It  outlines the factual, procedural and legal background of
the dispute in J.E.M.  and explains the rationale and scope of the Supreme
Court's decision.  It addresses the implications of the decision for the
agricultural community, including agricultural biotechnology companies, seed
companies, and agricultural producers.  It also explores the unique issues for
utility patent applications under the Utility Patent Act.
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7. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).
8. Brief for Respondent at 14, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
9. See Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation
at 3, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
10. Brief for Petitioner at 2, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
11. See id.
II.  THE ISSUE
The broad issue in J.E.M. was whether sexually reproducing plants,
specifically hybrid and inbred corn plants, are excluded from the scope of the
Utility Patent Act.7  The development of this issue is framed here in four parts:
first, a summary of the background facts creating the controversy; second, a
brief primer on the science of plant reproduction; third, a description of the
relevant patent statutory provisions and two pivotal pre-J.E.M. cases
interpreting these provisions; and fourth, an outline of the lower court
proceedings that defined the issue for the Supreme Court.
A.  Background 
1.  Parties.  
The parties in J.E.M. were the plaintiff, Pioneer Hi-Bred International
(hereinafter “Pioneer”), and defendants, J.E.M. AgSupply, Inc., dba, Farm
Advantage, and distributors and customers of Farm Advantage (defendants
are collectively referred to in this article as “Farm Advantage”).1  Henry A.
Wallace, who later served as Secretary of Agriculture and Vice-President of
the United States, founded Pioneer in 1926.8  As the world’s largest seed
producer, Pioneer is an agritech company producing genetically engineered
crops.9  
Farm Advantage is a family-owned agricultural supply business located
in Belmond, Iowa.10  The distributors of Farm Advantage are independent
contractors distributing supplies on behalf of Farm Advantage.11  
2.  Facts 
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12. See id. at 2–3.
13. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
14. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001). 
15. Brief for Petitioner at 3, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
16. Id. at 5–6.
17. Farm Advantage and its distributors were not licensed as sales representatives of Pioneer.  See
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. , 534 U.S. at 128.  
18. Brief for Petitioner at 3, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
19. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. , 534 U.S. at 128.
20. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.  2d 1813, 1814 (N.D. Iowa
1998).
In the early 1990s, Pioneer applied for patents on certain new varieties
of corn.12  The United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter
“PTO”) issued the patents to Pioneer under the Utility Patent Act between
January 21, 1992, and November 18, 1997.13  These patents covered the
manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of Pioneer’s inbred and hybrid corn
products.14  
In the 1998 growing season, Farm Advantage purchased 600 bags of
hybrid corn seed produced by Pioneer.15  The tags affixed to the Pioneer corn
seed bags stated the following:
The purchase of these seeds includes a limited license under patent(s)
[numbers omitted] (pending patent applications) to produce a single corn
crop in the United States (or other applicable country).  This license does not
extend to the use of seed from such crop or the progeny thereof for
propagation or seed multiplication.  Furthermore, the use of such seed or the
progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication or for production or
development of a hybrid or different variety of seed is strictly prohibited.16 
On its face, this limited license imposes two restrictions:  first, farmers are
limited to planting the seed for only a single corn crop; and second, purchasers
of the seed, such as Farm Advantage, are prohibited from making, using, or
selling the seed.17  Notwithstanding this restrictive language, Farm Advantage
sold the seeds to certain of its farm customers, who then planted the seeds in
their fields.18 
3.  Lawsuit
As a result of Farm Advantage’s sales, Pioneer brought a patent
infringement claim against Farm Advantage in federal district court.19  Pioneer
asserted that the hybrid seed corn sold by Farm Advantage was the subject of
one or more of seventeen utility patents issued to Pioneer.20 
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21. Id. at 1815.
22. Id. at 1817.
23. Id. at 1815.
24. Id.
25. Id. 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Brief of Amici Curiae Monsanto Company in Support  of the Respondent at 8, J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
29. Brief for Respondent at 1, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
30. Id.
Farm Advantage filed a counter-claim of patent invalidity on the grounds
that sexually reproducing plants (i.e., seed grown plants) are not included
within the scope of the subject-matter provision of the utility patent statute, the
Utility Patent Act.21  Farm Advantage asserted that Congress had superseded
the original utility patent statute when it created the PPA and PVPA and that
seeds and seed grown plants are protected exclusively by federal law under
the provisions of the PVPA. 22  Farm Advantage argued that since the PVPA
is the sole means of protection Congress intended to provide for sexually
reproducing plants,23 Pioneer’s seventeen utility patents were invalid.24  
In response, Pioneer argued that its utility patents were valid because
sexually reproducing plants are within the scope of the Utility Patent Act.25
Pioneer asserted that neither the PPA nor the PVPA superceded the Utility
Patent Act26 and that the PVPA is not the sole means of protection for
sexually reproducing plants.27
Until this case, no federal court had directly addressed whether sexually
reproduced plants achieved by plant breeding can be patented under the Utility
Patent Act.28  Thus, the parties’ allegations set the stage for a definitive ruling
on this issue.
B.  Plant Reproduction 
Plant reproduction is commonly divided into two methods: sexual and
asexual.29  Each method is distinct and raises separate legal issues.  Practical
considerations determine which method is used for commercial purposes.30 
1.  Sexual Reproduction 
Sexual reproduction involves fertilization, the union of male (pollen) and
female (ovule) cells (gamates), to produce a fertilized seed that can grow into
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31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id..
34. Id. 
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3.
37. See PETER H.  RAVEN, ET AL., BIOLOGY OF PLANTS (6th ed. 1999).
38. See S. REP. No. 71– 315, at 4–5 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 71–1129, at 4–6 (1930); HERBERT
HAYES & RALPH GARBER, BREEDING CROP PLANTS (McGraw-Hill 2d ed. 1927).
39. See T.  EVERETT, THE NEW YORK BOTANICAL GARDEN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HORTICULTURE 2801 (1981) (“Plants resulting from vegetative propagation are essentially
extensions of the old ones, having a separate physical existence, but identical genetically.”).
a plant.31  Self-fertilization occurs if the male and female gametes come from
a single individual, with pollen fertilizing the ovules inside the flowers on the
same individual.  Cross-fertilization occurs if the gametes are from different
individuals, even if genetically similar.  A “hybrid” results from the cross-
fertilization of plants that are of different varieties, i.e., plant lines that are
genetically distinct.32 
The goal of sexual reproduction is to produce homozygous plants that have
uniform genetic  makeup in a desired characteristic.33  Reaching this goal is a
“generational” process.  The plant grown from hybrid seed will produce seeds
of nonuniform characteristics, so that hybrids are not genetically stable after
the first generation.  Seed from one year’s hybrid crop cannot be used to re-
grow the same hybrid crop.  To produce “inbred” lines, a plant breeder repeats
controlled fertilization over many generations, with appropriate selection of
offspring containing the desired characteristics, thereby weeding out
undesirable traits.34
2.  Asexual Reproduction
“Asexual reproduction is reproduction without fertilization, i.e., without the
union of male and female cells.”35  Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting,
cutting, rooting, or budding and produces an offspring with a genetic
combination identical to that of the single parent.36  Asexual reproduction may
occur naturally where plants (e.g., some grasses, dandelions) send out runners
along the ground or put out underground stems that in turn produce new
plants.37  Asexual reproduction may also occur as part of human plant
breeding, where plants are artificially reproduced without fertilization by
established human-engineered methods, e.g., grafting one piece of the plant
onto a root piece, resulting in growth of a new plant.38  Where asexual
reproduction occurs either naturally or artificially, an asexually reproduced
plant is genetically identical to its parent.39
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40. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. , 534 U.S. at 132–145.
41. The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to enact laws relating to
patents in Article I, § 8, which reads “The Congress shall have the power . . .. to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
43. See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319.
44. As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Chakrabarty: “The Patent Act of
1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as ‘any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
[thereof].’  .  . . . Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed the same
broad language.  In 1952, when the patent laws were recodified, Congress replaced the word
‘art’ with ‘process,’ but otherwise left Jefferson’s language intact.  The Committee Reports
accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”  Chakrabarty,  447 U.S. at 308–09
(quoting S. REP.. No. 1979, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., 5 (1952);  H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82D  CONG.,
2D SESS., 6 (1952).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
46. See generally TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–36  (2001);
see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–36 (1966).
C.  Statutory Protection for Plant Patents  
In addressing the issue of whether sexually reproducing plants are
excluded from the Utility Patent Act, the Supreme Court in J.E.M.. examined
the relevant provisions of the Utility Patent Act, the PPA, and the PVPA. 40
Each of these statutes is distinct in its development, requirements, and
coverage.41  
1.  The Utility Patent Act
The first patent law was authored by Thomas Jefferson,42 enacted in
1793,43 and is now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The language of the original
act remains substantively unchanged.44  As amended, 35 U.S.C. § 101
provides that “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, or any new and useful
improvements thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions
and requirements of [Title 35].”45
Patents issued under § 101 are known as “utility patents”  because of its
requirement that a patentable invention be “useful.”46  Utility patents are
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47. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
48. See id. § 154 (a)(2).
49. See id. § 271(a).
50. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW (1998). 
51. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
52. See id. § 112.
53. Id.
54. See generally Cary Fowler,  The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its
Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y  621, 634 n.65 (2000).
55. Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980).
distinct from “design patents,” which are issued under 35 U.S.C. § 171 for
“new, original and ornamental design[s]” for articles of manufacture.47  
Utility patent protection is generally available for a term of twenty years
from the date of filing a patent application.48  During this period, the owner of
the patent has the right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling any
product or process containing or using the patented technology.49
The requirements for § 101 reflect the balance of promoting the property
interest of the inventor, the need to promote the progress of science, and the
recognition that progress comes from imitation and its refinement.50  The need
to restrict unfettered patent rights led to three enabling requirements that must
be satisfied to qualify as a utility patent: utility, novelty, and unobviousness over
the prior art.51  
In addition to these requirements, a written description is required by §
112.  This section requires a patent application to describe the “invention” with
sufficient particularity to enable someone skilled in the relevant technological
field to make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation.52
More specifically, § 112 states as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.53
Before 1930, the requirements for a utility patent were viewed as barriers
to patenting plants under the Utility Patent Act.54  This view arose from the
widely accepted “products-of-nature” doctrine, which stands for the
proposition that patents only can be issued for inventions stemming from
human ingenuity, not for something occurring naturally.55  Thus, little attention
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56. See generally Nathan A. Busch, Jack and the Beanstalk: Property Rights in Genetically
Modified Plants, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. No. 2 2002, at 1–35.
57. See Fowler, supra note 54, at 625–40.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
59. See generally Ann K. Wooster,  Annotation, Construction and Application of Plant Patent
Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 273 (1996).
60. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses , 69 F.3d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 1562 (quoting S. REP. No. 315, at 3 (1930)).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
63. Id. at § 161.
64. Id. at § 162.
was paid to applying the patent system to plant-related innovations until later
in the 20th century.56  
2.  The Plant Protection Act (PPA)
In 1930, new developments in plant reproduction and commercial plant
enterprise led to the passage of the PPA. 57  The pertinent language of the
PPA is found in § 161 of Title 35, which provides:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly
found seedings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an
uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.58
Congress’ intent in creating the PPA was to protect the output of plant
breeding efforts59 and to place agriculture on the same footing as industry with
respect to receiving benefits under the patent system.60  Thomas Edison
applauded the PPA, and, in support of it testified before Congress that “nothing
that Congress could do to help farming would be of greater value and
permanence than to give to the plant breeder the same status as the
mechanical and chemical inventors now have through the law.”61  In passing
the PPA, Congress rejected the “products of nature” doctrine. 
The PPA extended patent protection to asexually reproduced plants by
giving plant patent holders “the right to exclude others from asexually
reproducing the plant . . . or selling or using the plant so reproduced.”62  An
invention under the Utility Patent Act must be “new and useful” to obtain utility
patent protection, while a plant variety need only be “distinct and new” to be
protected by the PPA. 63  Moreover, § 161 plant patent applications are
expressly exempt from the description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 so
long as “the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.”64
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65. Imazio Nursery, Inc., 69 F.3d. at 1566.
66. A Senate Report noted that: “Whether the new variety is a sport, mutant or hybrid, the
patent right granted is a right to propagate a new variety by asexual reproduction.  It does not
include the right to propagate by seeds..  This limitation in the right granted recognizes a
practical situation and greatly narrows the scope of the bill.  S. REP. NO. 71–315, at 4
(1930).  The House concurred, stating: “To these ends the bill provides that any person who
invents or discovers a new and distinct variety of plant shall be given by patent an exclusive
right to propagate that plant by asexual reproduction; that is, by grafting, budding, cuttings,
layering, division, and the like, but not by seeds.”  H.R. REP. NO. 71–1129, at 1 (1930).
67. See Fowler, supra note 54, at 641.
68. Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization at 8, J.E.M.  Ag Supply,  Inc. (No.
99–1996).
69. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583.
70. Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Agricultural Research and
General Legislation of the Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 68
(1970). 
71. See id. at 52.
The PPA patent protection does not apply, however, to sexually
reproduced plants.65  Both houses of Congress explicitly rejected making
sexually reproducing plants patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent
Act.66  This restriction reflected the scientific understanding of the times: in
1930 no consensus existed as to whether sexually propagated plants could in
fact be distinguished from naturally occurring plants.67
3.  The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) 
Conventional beliefs about plant biology continued to shift and scientific
understanding continued to advance.  Doubts about the “ability to distinguish
new sexually propagated plant varieties from their naturally occurring
predecessors had abated.”68  Given this new environment, Congress in 1970
extended non-patent protection to seed-propagated plants by enacting the
PVPA. 69 
Another motivating factor for enacting the PVPA was that the
governments of several European countries had already “made available in
their respective countries a form of plant variety protection to developers of
sexually reproduced plants.”70  These European countries were signatories to
the 1961 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (hereinafter “UPOV Convention”) that established a
system of plant variety protection characterized by the United States
Department of Agriculture (hereinafter “USDA”) as “similar” to the PVPA. 71
The PVPA confers patent-like protection for certain sexually reproduced
plants by providing plant variety protection for “[t]he breeder of any sexually
reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who
100 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 28
72. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1994).
73. See id. § 2321.
74. Id. § 2483(a)(1), (h)(1).  
75. See id. § 2402.
76. See id. § 2402(a)(2).
77. Id. § 2402(a)(3).
78. See id. § 2402(a)(4).
79. Id. § 2422.
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).  
81. Id. This device was originally developed for microbiological inventions but has been adopted
for plants. Samples of seeds or plant cell tissue cultures are made freely available to the public
upon the grant of the patent.  See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A.  1970);  see also
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801–09 (2003).  These “descriptions” allow someone practiced in the field to
grow a genetic duplicate of any deposited plant described in a utility patent.  See Brief of
Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization at 5, J.E.M. Ag Supply,  Inc. (No.
99–1996).
82. See Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization at 5, J.E.M. Ag Supply,  Inc.
(No. 99–1996).
has so reproduced the variety . . . .”72  The PVPA is administered by the Plant
Variety Protection Office of the USDA. 73  The PVPA allows a plant breeder
to protect seed crops with a certificate of plant variety protection (hereinafter
“PVCP”) from the Secretary of Agriculture, granting the breeder the right “to
exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing
it” for twenty years from the date the certificate is issued.74 
The basic  requirement for obtaining a PVCP is that the new variety must
be new, distinct, uniform, and stable.75  To receive protection under the PVPA,
therefore, a new plant variety that is reproduced from seed must be clearly
distinct from other known varieties.76  The new plant variety must be uniform,
such that variations in the sexually reproduced plants “are describable,
predictable, and commercially acceptable.”77  The new plant variety must also
be stable so that the essential and distinctive characteristics of the variety are
present in sexually reproduced offspring.78  An application for a PVCP must
generally provide a description that is “adequate or as complete as is
reasonably possible.”79  It need not provide the degree and detail of disclosure
necessary to enable a third party to recreate the new plant variety, as is
required of utility patent specifications under 35 U.S.C. § 112.80  These types
of plant inventions can be fully and precisely described (using a procedural
device, the deposit of a sample, that itself developed over the second half of
the century)81 in a way that enables a third party to reproduce the invention
without undue experimentation, thereby satisfying the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112.82
Two unique exceptions, one for farmers and the other for researchers,
distinguish the PVPA from the PPA and utility patents under the Utility Patent
2003] National AgLaw Center 101
83. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).  This section provides that “it shall not infringe any right
hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended
from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such
saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person . . . .”  Id. 
84. See id. § 2544.  This section provides that “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected variety
for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the
protection provided under this Act.”  Id.  
85. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
86. See id. at 305.
87. See id. at 309.
88. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310–14.  See also In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 835–36
(C.C.P.A.  1940).  Well before Chakrabarty, the Patent and Trademark Office had ruled that
bacteria are not “plants” for purposes of obtaining patent protection under the PPA.  See 7
U.S.C. § 2401(a)(9) (1994) (defining “variety”).  Likewise, the Department of Agriculture
does not issue plant variety certificates for bacteria.  
89. See Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985).  
90. Id. at 444.
Act.  The first exception allows a farmer who legally purchases and plants a
protected variety to save the seed from these plants for replanting on his own
farm.83  The second exception permits a protected variety to be used for
research.84 
D.  Decisions That Facilitated Issuance of the Plant Utility Patents
Two important decisions, one by the United States Supreme Court and the
other by the Board of Patent Appeals, paved the way for patent protection for
plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In the first of these decisions, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 ruling, held that a live human-made
microorganism was patentable under § 101 as a “manufacture” or
“composition of matter.”85  Ananda Chakrabarty, a scientist, had developed a
bacterium capable of breaking down components of crude oil.86  The Supreme
Court reasoned that the microorganism was a product of human ingenuity
having a distinct name, character, and use.87  In its decision, the Court rejected
the argument that Congress’s adoption of the PPA and PVPA was evidence
of its intent to exclude living things from the scope of patentable subject matter
under § 101.88
Five years later and in reliance on Chakrabarty, the Patent Board of
Appeals and Interferences held in Ex parte Hibberd that 35 U.S.C. § 101
authorizes utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants, specifically,
corn varieties.89  The Board concluded that Chakrabarty had established “that
Section 101 includes man-made life forms, including plant life.”90  The Board
rejected the argument that Congress implicitly carved out from the scope of
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91. See id. at 445.
92. See 1077 Off.  Gaz. Pat. Office 24  (Apr. 21, 1987). In 1987, the PTO published a Notice in
its Official Gazette stating that it “considers nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular
living organisms . . . to be patentable subject matter within the scope of  35 U.S.C. § 101.”
93. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 446–447.
94. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. , 49 U.S.P.Q.  2d 1813 (N.D. Iowa
1998).
95. See id. at 1822.
96. See id. at 1819–22.
97. See id. at 1816–17.
98. See id. at 1817–22.
35 U.S.C. § 101 the subject matter covered by the PPA and PVPA.  Deeming
the Court’s analysis in Chakrabarty to be dispositive, the Board explained that
neither the PPA nor the PVPA restricts or limits the scope of patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.91  Nor, the Board reasoned, did
protecting plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101 create irreconcilable practical conflicts
with the PPA92 or the PVPA. 93
During the sixteen years following Hibberd, the PTO issued utility patents
protecting sexually reproduced plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  This practice
went unchallenged until February 1998, when Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc., sued a small Iowa seed and supply company named Farm Advantage
alleging infringement of patent rights.
III.  THE DECISION:  SEXUALLY REPRODUCING PLANTS ARE
NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE UTILITY PATENT
ACT
A.  Lower Court Proceedings
Pioneer brought suit before the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa.94  Both parties moved for summary judgment, and
the court granted Pioneer’s motion, while denying Farm Advantage’s motion.95
The court rejected Farm Advantage’s assertion that sexually reproducing
plants, like the varieties of genetically engineered corn covered by the patents
at issue, are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.96  The court
determined that established interpretative practice and congressional intent
supported a broad reading of the provision.97  It concluded that, in enacting the
PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants
from 35 U.S.C. § 101’s subject matter.98  In particular, the district court noted
2003] National AgLaw Center 103
99. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
100. Id. at 1378.
101. Id. at 1376.
102. Id. at 1378.
103. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (2000), cert.
granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 99–1996). 
104. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 126 (2001).  Justice Thomas was
joined in the opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsberg.  Justices Stephen Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion in which John Paul Stevens joined.  Justice Sandra Day O’Conner took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recused herself
because of a possible connection to DuPont.  See Richard A. Shanks & Joseph Mendelson,
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that Congress did not implicitly repeal § 101 by passing the more specific
PVPA because there was no irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes.
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s decision.99  Closely
following the district court’s reasoning, the Federal Circuit agreed with Pioneer
that “the asserted conflict [between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the PPA and PVPA]
is simply the difference in the rights and obligations imposed by the two
statutes.”100  The court also rejected Farm Advantage’s argument that
Chakrabarty “does not apply to plants because plants were intended to be
excluded from the patent system, as evidenced by the enactment of other
statutes to provide protection to plants.”101  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
held that sexually reproduced seeds are patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.102  Farm Advantage then successfully petitioned for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court.103
B.  Supreme Court Decision
On December 10, 2001, in a six to two opinion, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision and upheld Pioneer’s seed
patents. 104
1.  Majority Opinion
The Court examined the different rights and types of protection afforded
agricultural plants under each of the three applicable intellectual property
systems (PPA,  PVPA, and Utility Patent Act) and concluded that the
enactment of the PPA and the PVPA did not remove plants from the more
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general coverage of the Utility Patent Act.105  The following discussion divides
the Court’s analysis into four parts.
Chakrabarty:  The Court used the landmark decision in  Chakrabarty
as its point of departure, finding the language in 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be
extremely broad.106  The Court relied on the following language in
Chakrabarty:  “In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and
‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”107  The
Court determined that the conclusion reached in Chakrabarty was that living
things are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that a manmade micro-
organism fell within the scope of the statute.108    
a.  PPA:  The Court noted that the PPA’s text does not indicate that its
protection for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive.  The
Court stated: “[t]he 1930 PPA conferred patent protection to asexually
reproduced plants.  Significantly, nothing within either the original 1930 text of
the statute or its recodified version in 1952 indicates that the PPA’s protection
for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive.”109  On this
point, the Court appears to have overreached.  Neither Pioneer nor any lower
court opinion had ever suggested this view of the PPA.  There is no dispute
that Congress had expressly rejected seed patenting when it passed the
PPA. 110  Pioneer had argued simply that Chakrabarty’s expansion of the
breadth of 35 U.S.C. § 101, combined with Congress’ subsequent inaction
following Hibberd, confirmed congressional acceptance of the PTO’s
actions.111  
b.  PVPA:  The Court made two points relative to the PVPA.  The first
was that the PVPA does not expressly deny 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility patent
protection for sexually reproduced plants.112  The Court noted that while the
PVPA creates a statutory scheme, giving limited protection to plant varieties
that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, nowhere does it restrict the scope
of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.113  
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119. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. , 534 U.S. at 146 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The second point was that the PVPA did not alter 35 U.S.C. § 101’s
subject matter coverage by implication.114  The Court noted that a repeal by
implication requires that the earlier and later statutes be irreconcilable.115  The
Court found that differences in the requirements for, and coverage of, utility
patents and PVPA plant variety certificates do not present irreconcilable
conflicts because the requirements of a § 101 utility patent are more stringent
than those for a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded by a utility
patent are greater than those afforded by a PVP certificate.116 
c.  Congressional  Inaction: The Court found it compelling that the PTO
has assigned utility patents for plants for at least sixteen years, without any
indication from either Congress or the agencies with expertise that coverage
is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA. 117  Although the Court did not
expressly rely on it, it is highly probable that a significant factor weighing in
favor of affirming the decisions of the lower courts was the reliance by the
biotechnology companies on the PTO’s authorization of utility patent protection
for sexually reproduced plants.118
2.  Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia saw the case as presenting [a]n
interesting and difficult point of statutory construction, seemingly pitting against
each other two perfectly valid canons of interpretation: (1) that statutes must
be construed in their entirety, so that the meaning of one provision sheds light
upon the meaning of another; and (2) that repeals by implications are not
favored.119
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In Justice Scalia’s view, the question before the Court was whether the
term “composition of matter” included living things.  He concluded that “there
was no way in which ‘composition of matter’  could be regarded as a category
separate from plants, but not separate from other living things.”120  The
Chakrabarty decision, according to Justice Scalia, ruled that this issue was no
longer an “open question.”  He opined that “the canon against repeal by
implication comes into play, and I agree with the Court that it determines the
outcome.  I therefore join the opinion of the Court.”121
3.  Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Breyer focused on congressional intent in enacting
the PPA and PVPA, finding that Congress intended these statutes to exclude
plant protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.122  Justice Breyer stated:
I believe that the words ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ do not
cover these plants.  That is because Congress intended the two more specific
statutes to exclude patent  protection under Utility Patent Statute for the
plants to which the more specific acts directly refer.  And, as the Court
implicitly recognizes, this Court neither considered, nor decided, this
question in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.123
This rationale adopts Farm Advantage’s argument.  Justice Thomas, writing
for the majority, responded to the dissenting opinion as follows:
Justice Breyer argues that Diamond v. Chakrabarty cannot determine the
outcome of this case because it did not answer the precise question
presented.  But this simply misses the mark.  Chakrabarty broadly
interpreted the reach of § 101.  This interpretation is surely germane to the
question whether sexually reproduced plants fall within the subject matter of
§ 101.  In addition, Chakrabarty’s discussion of the PPA and the PPVA is
relevant to petitioners’ primary arguments against utility patent protection for
sexually reproduced plants.124
Regardless of Congress’ actual intent, the Supreme Court has clearly
spoken: sexually reproducing plants are not excluded from the Utility Patent
Act of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF SUPREME COURT’S DECISION TO
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY
The Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M. is significant to the agricultural
community in several respects.  First, the decision has numerous implications
for biotechnology companies, producers, and society.  Second, the decision
fuels the international debate over the role of biotechnology in agriculture and
intellectual property rights.  Third, the decision places the burden squarely on
Congress to determine whether changes will be made to the statutory
protection of plant patents.
A.  Implications of J.E.M. to Biotechnology Companies, Producers, and
Society
The implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M. to the
biotechnology and seed companies and to producers are immediately evident.
Not as evident, but nevertheless significant, are the implications to society.
1.  Protection of the Vested Interest of the Biotechnology Industry in
Agriculture
The inventive activity encouraged by the availability of utility patent
protection contributes to a thriving agricultural biotechnology industry.125  At
the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M., over 1,800 utility patents
had been obtained for seed and plant-related patents.126  Examples include
patents issued on corn plants expressing Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) insecticidal
proteins;127 herbicide-resistant crops, such as sugar beets containing the
ROUNDUP READY TM gene;128 sunflowers “conventionally” bred to
contain high levels of the more healthful unsaturated oleic acid;129 bananas,
tomatoes, and other fruit recombitantly modified to contain edible vaccines;130
108 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 28
131. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,468 (issued Apr. 16, 1996).
132. U.S. Patent No. 5,780,709 (issued July 14, 1998).
133. Brief of Amici Curiae American Seed Trade Association in Support  of Respondent, at 2,
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  (No. 99–1996).
134. Brief of Amici Curiae Cargill, Inc. in Support of Respondent, at 2, J.E.M.  Ag Supply,  Inc.
(No. 99–1996).
135. See generally ARNEL ROY HALLAUER, Maize, in PRINCIPLES OF CULTIVAR DEVELOPMENT
(Walter R. Fehr ed., 1987).
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141. Additionally, it has been asserted that the decision is an affirmation by the United States
Supreme Court of the importance of intellectual property at a time of major challenges to
the underlying premise of strong intellectual property protection.  These challenges are
reflected in: The Qatar Declaration of November 14, 2001, concerning the interpretation of
plants that produced nutritionally superior mixtures of dietary amino acids;131
and maize with increased water stress tolerance.132  
A decision by the Supreme Court in favor of Farm Advantage would have
dealt a severe financial blow to biotechnology and seed companies.133
Because sexual reproduction is a generational process, development of new
and better plants takes many years and an enormous investment.134  As no
formula exists for selecting the proper plants to cross- and to self-pollinate, the
breeding process often involves as much “art” as it does science. 135
Moreover, modern breeders employ costly advanced technologies (such as
molecular analysis and gas chromatography) to assist in their creation of
superior hybrids.136
At the same time, biotechnology companies are concerned with the ease
with which plants can be copied.137  Once a new plant line has been stabilized,
further self-pollination can create thousands of replicas of the plant.138  Thus,
the plant breeder, after incurring the high cost of years of development, is
faced with the possibility that others will simply “free ride” on its research.139
Without some promise that the plant breeder will be able to protect its
developments, the prospects for financial backing for risky research might be
reduced or eliminated.140
2.  Integration of the Plant Patent Statutory Scheme
The Supreme Court’s decision arguably gives flexibility by allowing the
three statutory systems (PPA,  PVPA, and Utility Patent Act) to complement
each other.141  Despite the potential for broad protection of genetically
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146. Michael J. Phillips, The Future of Biotechnology, Lecture at the 2001 D.W. Brooks
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engineered or otherwise improved plants by utility patents, the conventional
plant breeder who discovers a distinctive new variety under cultivation or
develops one by cross-breeding techniques is still free to secure more limited
protection by fulfilling the less exacting requirements for a plant patent or
PVPC.  Although most biotechnology plant inventions are filed as utility
patents,142 the availability of utility patents for plants has not completely
discouraged the conventional plant breeder from seeking PPA or PVPA
protection.143  “This development might presage a significant realignment in the
seed industry’s intellectual property portfolio strategy” with respect to
maintaining PPA,  PVPA, and utility patent protection for proprietary
varieties.144
3.  Encouragement of Further Biotechnology Development in Agriculture
The Supreme Court’s decision helps create further incentives for plant
inventors to research, develop, and market new plant products that will
radically change American agriculture.145  These changes include  an expected
shift in emphasis to “second wave” value products that include enhancing food,
livestock, industrial, and pharmaceutical products.146
Whether biotechnology development in agriculture should be promoted is
the subject of a vigorous debate.  Proponents claim that biotechnology offers
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the three significant potential benefits: (1) radically increasing current levels of
agricultural production, (2) dramatically improving the quality of health care,
and (3) measurably contributing to a cleaner environment.147  In response,
opponents argue that these benefits are unproven and that biotechnology may
in fact result in lower yields and may also endanger the environment and the
health of consumers.148 
i.  Agricultural Production
The great hope for genetically engineered crops is that they will feed the
world.149  Biotechnology offers a potential answer to the great fear that with
burgeoning populations, mass starvation is only a matter of time.150  As
populations have grown, the amount of arable land in the United States and
elsewhere in the world has steadily decreased.151  The growing world
population)reaching over 6 billion people in the year 2000)has brought about
the steady conversion of farmland into home and apartment sites, shopping
centers, parking lots, and office buildings.152  Despite this continuing decrease
in arable land, food shortages have been avoided in large part by the increased
productivity and yields achieved by American farmers.153  Sustained
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productivity increases, many believe, depend on the development of
biotechnology and its application to agriculture.154
However, some doubt the promises of higher yields by the biotechnology
industry.  These skeptics claim that the yields are actually lower in some
cases,155 and that the use of transgenic  crops, such as B+ crops, will lead to
insects that become resistant to insecticides, similar to the development of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.156
ii.  Nutritional Value of Crops
Proponents of biotechnology foods point to benefits to health and
nutrition.157  In addition to higher yields, nutritionally-enhanced crops could
provide more nutritious foods, which could be of special benefit to Third World
countries.158  Proponents also point out that an estimated 60 percent of all
processed foods contain at least one genetically engineered component, and
that no health problems attributable to a genetically engineered foods have
been detected.159
Many do not share the belief that biotechnology can increase the nutritional
value of foods.  Consumer groups question whether potential risks to human
health have been adequately studied.160  Some consumers worry that
unforeseen dangers, such as unknown food allergies, may occur in genetically
engineered crops.161
iii.  The Environment
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Agricultural biotechnology promises to benefit the environment by
lessening reliance on pesticides and other crop inputs.162  One means of
achieving remarkable results in crop yields is an increase in the use of
chemical herbicides and pesticides.163  However, environmental impact issues
relating to the use of such chemicals are increasing.164  
Not all share the view that the employment of biotechnology in agriculture
benefits the environment.  There is a concern that potential risks to the
environment have not been adequately studied.165  Some fear that genetically
engineered crops could lead to an accidental release of genes into the
environment that could destroy the delicate balance in an ecosystem.166 
4.  Facilitation and Promotion of Emerging Trends in Agriculture
Several dramatic changes and trends are occurring in the agriculture
community.  Although the causes of these changes are complex and varied,
the issuance of utility patents to plant breeders has contributed, at least in part,
to these changes and trends.  By encouraging further biotechnology
development in agriculture, the Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M. will
contribute to and perhaps even accelerate these changes.
i.  Genetic Erosion:
The first of these trends is genetic erosion.  Allegedly caused by increased
intellectual rights that restrict access to genetic  resources, genetic erosion is
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the loss of genetic  diversity through extinction.167  Diversification has helped
stabilize American agriculture.168  Diversification occurs where plant breeders
have access to a wide range of genetic variability to develop healthier strains
and meet changing conditions.  
Diversification is disappearing, however.169  Modern agriculture has
become dependent upon a relatively small number of commercial crop species,
some of which are dominated by a relatively small number of varieties within
the species.170  The lack of genetic variability or diversity within these crops
means that crops react similarly to drought, disease, sex, and other factors,
thus increasing the likelihood of large-scale crop failure.171 
Genetic erosion has captured the attention of the international community,
as the worldwide preservation of genetic diversity in the plant kingdom is an
important international policy objective.172  Some argue, however, while
genetic  diversification is important, the claim that genetic  erosion is caused by
the issuance of utility patents is unsupportable.  A recent study notes “market
and agronomic  forces,” rather than intellectual property rights, may be “the
major factors leading to genetic  erosion and the loss of genetic diversity, and
“increased competition” resulting from the availability of intellectual property
rights may “lead to more marked product differentiation among firms which,
in turn, may enhance genetic  diversity.”173  Some supporters of the theory
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cost of soybean seed has increased from $12.92 per planted acre in 1985 to $19.25 per
planted acre in 1999.  For cost of soybean seed in 1985, see USDA, Economic Research
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ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/data/history/Soyb/H-USSoyb.xls.  For cost of soybean seed
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even concede that the theory of genetic diversification is largely inapplicable
to already-industrialized countries such as the United States.174
ii.  Consolidation of the Seed Industry
Significant consolidation of the seed industry is occurring at a phenomenal
rate.  Between 1995 and 1998, approximately sixty-eight seed companies were
either acquired by or entered into joint ventures with six large multinational
corporations.175  Some attribute this consolidation to utility patents.176  They
contend that utility patents will create an incentive for companies to acquire
control of basic  materials, to limit access to those materials, and to seek further
patent protection as a means of continuing control.177 
Some fear consolidation will lead to dramatic increases in the prices of
seeds.178  Since the seed company has an absolute monopoly on a patented
variety, the price is not driven down by competition.  Thus, the seed company
can charge the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay for the new plant
variety.179
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Feb.1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 3680377.  Monsanto is an agribiotech company engaged
iii.  Traditional Right to Save Seed
The issuance of utility patents has taken away the farmer’s traditional right
to save seed.180  This development has two dimensions.  The first is the
economic  consequence to farmers and seed companies.  The second is the
loss of a practice of historically important social utility.  
The economic  consequence to farmers and seed companies is obvious:
every time a farmer replants with saved seed, the seed companies lose a
potential sale, while restricting a farmer from saving seed compels the farmer
to spend more money on seed.  Less obvious, but no less important, is the
social utility attached to a farmer’s traditional right to save seed.  Most plant
breeders build upon the accumulated innovation of farmers who played a major
role in ensuring a diverse genetic  pool by expanding the germplasm base of
modern agriculture through many years of experimentation and creation of
thousands of new plant varieties.181  This role has been facilitated by the ability
to save seed and the exchange of this seed among farmers and breeders.182
iv.  Seed Purchasing Agreements
The issuance of utility patents has also resulted in the increased use of
seed purchasing agreements between the farmer and the seed company.  As
in J.E.M., these agreements may limit the farmer to planting the seed for only
a single crop year and prohibiting the farmer from storing or selling the seed.183
The general concern with seed purchasing agreements is that they lead to the
“industrialization” of farming by requiring farmers to use limited licenses with
seed purchases and encouraging the use of contract production.184  
This general concern is predicated upon several specific concerns.  First,
farmers actually become licensees of technology.185  Second, the farmer must
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agree to use the seed only once.186  Many farmers187 claim they cannot afford
to purchase expensive bioengineered seed each year.188  Third, these
agreements forbid farmers’ traditional practice of saving seed to replant the
following year.189  Fourth, they can mandate the conditions of post-harvest use
and sale of the patented crop.190  Fifth, they enable companies to force binding
arbitration as a sole method of settling disputes.191  Sixth, they also enable the
patent holder to use local courts through a right of venue clause to enforce
their ownership rights.192  Seventh, these agreements also require acceptance
of limited warranties that significantly narrow the liability of the patent holder
or seed seller for any and all losses, injuries, or damages resulting from the use
or handling of the seed.193  Finally, they contain specific use restrictions on the
seed.194
Seed companies argue these agreements are necessary to protect their
intellectual property rights developed only after a substantial investment in time
and money.195 
v.  Litigation with Farmers
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The issuance of utility patents has indirectly created defendant farmers.196
Patents for modified plants rank second only to software patents for the
number of legal challenges filed. 197  There were 8,200 cases in 1999 alone.198
Monsanto has filed more than 475 lawsuits against farmers for patent
infringement and violation of “technology user” agreements for saving seed or
selling or trading to fellow farmers.199  J.E.M. gives the biotechnology
companies more confidence to enforce their intellectual property rights through
litigation.
vi.  The Changing Nature of Some Patent Infringement Claims
The patenting of sexually reproducing plants may also change the nature
of patent infringement claims.  Many patented seed varieties are from open
pollinated crops whose pollen can infect neighboring farms planted with
unpatented varieties. Such cross-pollination has occurred with the StarLink?
genetically engineered corn variety patented by Aventis.200 StarLink?, which
does not have regulatory approval for human consumption, has reportedly
contaminated cornfields across the country that were not planted with the
variety, causing significant economic harm to many farmers.201  The ultimate
result of StarLink?-like cross pollination can be that a farmer who attempts to
save his or her seed becomes an involuntary infringer of a patent if the genetic
content of his seed has changed as a result of this biological pollution.202
B.  International Debate
The Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M. fuels an intense international
debate over the role of biotechnology in agriculture.  This debate involves
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issues such as global genetic  diversity, the continued viability of important land
races, north-south sea trade and appropriation, and industrial and rural
agricultural concerns.203  The key constituencies in the debate include
biotechnology companies, First and Third World farmers, indigenous people,
nations, environmentalists, scientists, and First and Third World consumers.204
Although there are several constituencies, the dividing line in the debate is
straightforward: developed countries versus developing countries. 
The Supreme Court’s decision comports with the position of developed
countries, who want their technological innovations and investments to be
granted strong intellectual property rights in developing countries to protect
against piracy and to ensure monetary return on their investments.205  The
Supreme Court’s analysis in J.E.M. reflects this market-oriented approach of
developed countries. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s decision is the antithesis of the
view towards intellectual property rights in developing countries, especially as
applied to agriculture.  Developing countries prefer a system of intellectual
property rights that supports and promotes the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits arising from the use and development of genetic resources.206
Developing countries are concerned intellectual property law favors
technological innovation that has emerged from industrialized countries and
disfavors farmers from gene-rich developing countries who, over generations,
have contributed, approved, and preserved plant species.207    
C.  Places Burden on Congress to Effect Changes
The Supreme Court’s decision places the burden on Congress to make
changes to the availability or scope of plant patents.  This is consistent with the
Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, where the Court noted that “Congress, not
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the courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once
Congress has spoken it is the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”208  In J.E.M., the Court noted that even with the PTO
recognizing and regularly issuing utility patents for plants since Hibberd,
Congress has failed to pass legislation indicating it disagrees with the PTO’s
interpretation of § 101.209    
Congress, on the surface at least, tacitly favors the outcome reached by
the Court in J.E.M.  The Supreme Court believed expansion of 35 U.S.C. §
101 to include sexually reproduced plants is consistent with Congressional
intent.210  Moreover, Congress has traditionally favored expansion of
intellectual property rights consistent with scientific development. 
Given the significant stakes to the agriculture community and to society,
as the science of biotechnology increases, the issues will become increasingly
complex and the social costs increasingly higher, as they are becoming with
transgenic  animals.211  If Congress elects to deliberate on the important policy
considerations derived from the expanded use of utility patents, Congress
needs to initially determine the value of biotechnology to agriculture.  This will
require an evaluation of the claimed values of biotechnology, including the
increase in crop production and environmental and health benefits.  These
benefits will need to be weighed against the social costs of biotechnology to
farmers.  The impact of biotechnology on family farms is likely to be viewed
in the context of the value placed by Congress on family farms in other
contexts and social programs.212  The costs and benefits to consumers and
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society in general will need to be carefully evaluated.  Congress should also
consider the international interests.  
This evaluation will raise important issues regarding the relationships
between producers and seed companies and whether the alleged benefits of
genetically modified foods are worth the social risks to producers and
consumers.
V.  UNIQUE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH QUALIFYING PLANTS
UNDER THE UTILITY PATENT ACT
The Patent Utility Act is the protection statute preferred by plant
breeders.213  Genetically engineered plants are often protected most effectively
under § 101, rather than under the PPA or the PVPA, 214 because a utility
patent generally affords greater protection to its holder than does a PVPA
certificate.215  The plant invention typically involves more than one plant
variety and may relate to a whole species.216  The inventor-breeder can claim
the individual components of the variety, including DNA sequence, gene, tissue
culture, seed, or specific  plant part.  The inventor-breeder can also claim
methods using the variety to make other varieties or hybrids and any hybrid
varieties created in the future resulting from use of its patented varieties.217 
A.  Satisfying Requirements of Section 101
Since the Utility Patent Act is the preferred protection statute by plant
breeders, those who want protection should be aware of the qualifying
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and unique issues associated with plant
patent protection.  As discussed, to qualify under the Utility Patent Act, the
requirements of usefulness, novelty, and unobviousness over the prior art must
2003] National AgLaw Center 121
218. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
219. M.R. Carrillo-Heian, Eat Your Vegetables and Be Sued for Patent Infringement, 32
MCGEORGE L.  REV. 957, 990 (2001).
220. Id.
221. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
222. See ADELMAN, supra note 50, at 181.  
223. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
224. See id.
225. See ADELMAN, supra note 50, at 190.
226. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and
European Approaches , 39 J.L.  & TECH. 143, 149 (1999).  
227. Elisa Rives, Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and
Their Progeny Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L.  REV. 187, 213
(2001). 
be satisfied.218  Satisfying these requirements has not proven difficult for the
plant breeder.  Nevertheless, as noted below, there are certain issues that the
plant breeder must recognize.  Moreover, the PTO cannot continue to expand
the scope of patentable subject matter indefinitely.219  A shrinking public
domain and the realization that less is available for future inventors might cause
courts to rule in favor of reducing the scope of patentable subject matter and
narrowing the interpretation of current patents.220 
1.  Utility 
Under § 101 of the Utility Patent Act, plant inventions must be “useful” to
receive patent protection.221  The question of how “useful” an invention must
be to be patentable has been well-defined in the case law and presents little or
no trouble to the average patentee.222  According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he
threshold of utility is not high:  An invention is useful under section 101 if it is
capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”223  The PTO is not looking for
something better, but rather for something that is different from the state of the
art.224  Outside of the chemical-patent field, the “utility” requirement has
presented little or no obstacle to patenting225 and has rarely, if ever, been
raised as an obstacle to the patent of breeder’s and biotechnician’s efforts in
the plant arena.226  Since plants and seed are useful by their nature, there
should be few problems to patenting sexually reproducing plants based on
“utility.”227
2.  Novelty
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Under § 102, a person is entitled to a patent unless “the invention was
known or used by others in the country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent.”228  Thus, patents are barred when the invention is not
new or “novel.”229  In essence, the novelty requirement means a person must
be the first to invent something new under the United States patent system.230
Although simple in concept, the relationship of a claimed invention to the
existing art in the public domain is among the most difficult and misunderstood
aspects of a substantive patent law.231 For a “reference” or “prior art” to
invalidate a claim, “each and every element of the claimed invention must be
disclosed in a prior art reference” in such a way that would enable others to
practice the invention.232  In other words, if someone of “ordinary skill in the
art” would be able to discern the claimed invention from the prior art
referenced, then the patent is said to be invalid due to “anticipation,” because
it is not new or novel.233 
While the amount of litigation under § 102 (a) is considerable, the novelty
requirement presents the same obstacle to patenting in the case of plants and
seed produced by sexually reproducing as it would for inventors in any field.234
The inquiry then is who is the first to invent something. 235 
3.  Obviousness
Section 103 (a) provides 
A patent  may not be obtained though the invention is not  identically
disclosed or described as set forth in 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.236
Thus, obviousness under § 103 is a statutory bar to patent protection.237
2003] National AgLaw Center 123
238. See Overwalle, supra note 220, at 152.
239. See ADELMAN, supra note 50, at 447.
240. See id. at 494.
241. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1984 & Supp. 2001).
242. See Rives, supra note 227, at 217.
243. Id.
244. Id. 
On its face, the concern with this requirement as it relates to plant
breeding is that traditional plant breeding techniques are obvious to an ordinary
artisan skilled in the art of plant breeding.238  However, this concern dissipates
under the “sweat-of-the-brow” doctrine, which establishes a patentable
invention if painstaking efforts or extensive experimentation are taken above
and beyond existing art to achieve the inventive results.239 
Another concern is where the patenting of a bioengineering process and
the resulting genetically altered plant product is involved.240  Section 103(b)
addresses the problem of biotechnology processes.  Under § 103(b),
[b]iotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of a matter that
is novel under section 102 and nonobvious under subsection (a) [of the
statute] . . . shall be considered nonobvious if – (A) claims to the process and
the composition of matter are contained in either the same application for
patent  or in separate applications having the same effective filing date; and
(B) the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented,
were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to
the same person .  . . . . [A biotechnological process is defined under the act
as] a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing single- or multi-
celled organism to)(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, (ii) inhibit,
eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide
sequence, or (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally
associated with said organism.241  
Thus, under § 103(b), the claimed process and the claimed composition
matter must be patented together for an invention to meet the requirement of
nonobviousness under § 103(b).242  The courts have not interpreted § 103(b)
as it pertains to transgenically altered sexually reproducing plants, making it
difficult to discern what interpretation the courts will give the statute in this
context.243  “In any case, Congress has expressed a clear intent that the
nonobviousness requirement will not defeat biotechnologic al processes even
if nonobviousness is defined in a more restrictive manner in terms of the
transgenic organisms.”244  Therefore, the requirement of nonobviousness under
§ 103 does not appear to be a significant bar to the patenting of sexually
reproduced organisms under the utility patent statutes.
124 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 28
245. See McManis, supra note 205, at 265.
246. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
247. Id. at § 271(g).
248. See ADELMAN, supra note 50, at 813.
249. See id. 
250. For an instructive article addressing biotechnology and international law, see Sean D. Murphy,
Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARVARD INT’L L.  J. 47 (2001). 
251. See 35 U.S.C. § 351 (1994).
252. See ADLEMAN, supra note 50, at 850-53.
253. See id. 
254. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections for
Living Matter:  Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture,
27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 83, 105 (1995).
255. See e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (an appeal from a three-way
interference in which British, Israeli, and Japanese teams of inventors contested priority of
invention of DNA that codes for human fibroblast beta-interferon).
B.  International Limitations 
There is no unifying system for international intellectual property or patent
law.245  Patents issued by the PTO are effective only within the territory of the
United States.246  The United States patent law does protect somewhat against
the import of nonpatented products produced abroad by a process patented in
the United States.247  Without foreign patent protection, however,  the
manufacture and sale of such products outside of the United States cannot be
prohibited.248  To obtain patent protection in foreign countries, an application
must be filed in each country where protection is desired.249  The United
States is party to international agreements250 facilitating this process.251  Unlike
the United States, most foreign countries offer no grace period for prior use
and publication of the invention.252  Foreign rights may be lost as a result of
any prior commercial use or publication of the invention prior to filing of patent
applications.253  Thus, for an inventor who would like to pursue patent
protection outside the United States, thousands of dollars in filing costs and
attorneys’ fees are required per jurisdiction without the guarantee that a patent
will be granted.254
C.  Multiple Applicants to the Same Plant Invention
A problem for plant breeders occurs when there is more than one claimant
to the same invention.255  When applications by multiple applicants to the same
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invention are simultaneously pending, or a pending application interferes with
the unexpired patent, the PTO Commissioner may declare interference.256 
Plant breeders must always keep good and promptly witnessed records of
all aspects of research in biotechnology to support subsequent applications for
patent protection.257  This need was illustrated in Singh v. Brake,258 where the
Federal Circuit overturned a Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences’ decision awarding priority of invention in a DNA
construct to Anthony J. Brake.259  The issue was whether an inventor’s
testimony needs to be corroborated.260  The Federal Circuit concluded that the
inventor’s laboratory notebook, not witnessed until several years after the fact,
could provide corroboration of the inventor’s testimony regarding conception
but not reduction to practice.261  The Federal Circuit determined the decision
of the Board was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded so the
Board could reweigh the sufficiency of the evidence and reach additional
factual conclusions.262
D.  Other Tools of Protection
1.  Trade Secret Protection
Another important plant-protection tool long employed by plant breeders
is trade secret law.263  Until Holden, when the PTO reversed its stance on the
issuance of utility patents for sexually reproducing plants, seed companies
typically employed trade secrets to protect the parental line.264  Trade secret
protection still serves as a valuable tool in protecting the interest of seed
producers. 
In broad terms, a trade secret is virtually any type of confidential
information offering a competitive advantage in the marketplace due to its
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secrecy.265  The definition of a trade secret depends on a particular state since
state law regulates trade secrets .266  Today, however, some forty-two states
have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act, thereby substantially harmonizing
trade secret laws across the country.267  
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret includes a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that offers
a competitive advantage, actual or potential, because it is not generally known
and is not readily ascertainable by property means and is reasonably guarded
by its owner to protect it secrecy.268  “Not readily ascertainable” means
information  not available in trade journals, reference books, or other published
materials.269  
Trade secrets are different from patents in several ways. 270  First, unlike
patents where the underlying purpose is to encourage disclosure to promote
technological development, the heart of trade secret law is secrecy.  Second,
trade secrets are not restricted to certain types of subject matter.  Third, a
trade secret does not need to meet the rigorous criteria for patentability.  In
fact, trade secret law protects all inventions and information so long as they
confer a competitive advantage, irrespective of whether the invention is new,
obvious, or simplistic.  As such, all patentable inventions are protectable as
trade secrets; however, not all trade secrets are patentable.  Fourth, unlike
patents , trade secrets do not expire after a set period of time and fall into the
public  domain.  They may be protected forever.  Fifth, and most significantly,
the owner of a trade secret does not enjoy an absolute property right in the
trade secret that would exclude all others from using the secret.271  Unlike
other types of inventions, an intellectual property interest embodied in seed is
self-replicating.  This makes protection under trade secret law difficult because
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276. The duration of a copyright “in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its
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seeds can be acquired legally, genetically analyzed, and replicated
indefinitely.272
2.  Copyright Protection
17 U.S.C. § 102 provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.”273  Copyright protection has not yet been
extended to genetically modified organisms, because the sequences
incorporated into most genetically modified organisms are not original.  As
technology becomes more sophisticated, it is possible that artificial and original
sequences of DNA will be protected through copyright.274  There are several
advantages to copyright law,275 including the fact that copyrights afford
protection for a longer period of time than does a patent,276 and the existence
in addition to patent protection, not as an alternative to it.277  
VI.  CONCLUSION
J.E.M. is a landmark case in the agriculture community because it
affirmed the inclusion of sexually reproducing plants within the scope of the
Utility Patent Act.  The plant breeder now has three intellectual property plant
protection statutes at its disposal, each with unique qualification criteria and
scope.  Of the three statues, the Utility Patent Act is the most significant in
terms of accommodating and promoting the growth of biotechnology in
agriculture.
The J.E.M. decision has significant implications for biotechnology and seed
companies, producers, and consumers. The decision protects, sustains, and
promotes the investment and economic stake of biotechnology products in the
agriculture sector. The decision also validates and contributes to profound
trends within the agriculture sector caused in whole or in part by the explosive
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growth of biotechnology.  These developments have altered the relationships
producers have with seed companies, created additional economic  pressures
for producers, changed the nature of farming for producers, and exposed
producers to new forms of liability.  Whether consumers and society will
benefit depends on the extent of the touted environmental, nutritional, and
economic benefits from the growth of biotechnology products. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress bears the burden to
make changes concerning the role and development of biotechnology plant
products within the intellectual property framework of the agriculture sector.
If and when congressional action occurs, legislation should be predicated upon
scientific and commercial development as well as a careful weighing of
societal objectives, values, and concerns.  Rather than being limited to the
PPA and PVPA, the plant breeder now has the Supreme Court’s backing in
patenting its plant products under the general utility patent statute.
Qualification issues for utility patents for the plant breeder are not significant;
however, the plant breeder should be cognizant of international limitations and
the problem of multiple applications to the same plant invention.  Also, the plant
breeder should be aware of other tools of intellectual property protection for
plant inventions, including trade secrets and copyrights. 
